Down With the Ship: Thoughts on Afghanistan
I spent most of 2020 as the Aide-de-Camp to the commanding general of Kandahar Airfield (KAF). As I departed Kandahar on January 1st, 2021 — days before the base was handed over to Afghan forces — I leaned over to my boss as we shared the same thoughts: its only a matter of time until the Taliban will rule again.
Anyone who spent time in Afghanistan knew that in the long run NATO efforts would prove futile. The end state, at least tactically and institutionally, was known. But as history begins to write an eerily similar narrative to 1975 Saigon, two aspects of the story should be established.
1) The US, nor any of our NATO partners, should bear the blame for the fall of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).
I sat in a years’ worth of meetings as an Aide-de-Camp where I watched military leaders convey again and again the necessity for initiative on the part of the Afghan military. There is no doubt that the national Afghan military and political leaders became far too comfortable operating under a protective umbrella of US and Coalition Forces. They behaved as though the Afghan leaders led the way on the battlefield while the majority were busy partaking in every act of corruption. Some might argue that the “corruption” is merely a western perspective that fails to understand the culture Afghan leaders were raised in. But many of the leaders within GIRoA were western educated in Europe of the US. They spent years in institutions gaining a nuanced understanding of right and wrong. They were exposed to leaders of character and leaders who lacked character. They knew better. They were called to be the difference in the newly established Afghan government and they failed their people.
Coalition Forces implored ANDSF leaders to undercut corruption and ensure their soldiers were paid or they wouldn’t fight. We built and gave them an electronic pay system and their leaders failed to even sign half of their soldiers up with bank accounts to be paid.
Coalition Forces implored ANDSF leaders to take charge of aviation maintenance when we knew the time was coming for contracted maintenance to end. ANDSF leaders not only failed to pick up any aspect of maintenance but also suffered multiple in-air crashes due to negligence.
Coalition Forces implored ANDSF leaders to go see their troops in person, at their check points — the most basic aspect of military leadership. President Ghani’s fleeing from Kabul is indicative of nearly every other leader’s failure to ever put anyone else but themselves first.
Coalition Forces implored ANDSF leaders to stand firm at every check point they controlled. I witnessed night after night ANDSF forces drop their weapons and run from the Taliban while they called in for air support from Coalition Forces.
The saying goes that you can lead a horse to water but they must drink for themselves. Coalition Forces’ advising wasn’t perfect — but it existed. The world tried to help for two decades, and when the reins were handed over, the ANDSF chose to give it all up in 11 days.
2) There are men and women from Afghanistan who gave more than we will ever know or understand.
Seb and Ramzi — the two interpreters who worked for me come to mind. Both fled from Afghanistan as teenagers and walked for months from Afghanistan to France. They were beaten, frozen, starved, and terrified. But they survived. They made it to the UK, gained citizenship, and built a family.
Then they went back to Afghanistan as interpreters.
They went back and risked everything because they loved their country, they had hope in its potential.
I met both Seb and Ramzi the first day I arrived in Kandahar and spent nearly sixteen hours a day with them ofr over ten months. They translated everything from conversations with Afghan government officials to the 10,000 line excel sheet documenting every piece of equipment Coalition Forces signed over to Afghan forces. As we sat in the headquarters one night, Seb asked me why I would ever volunteer for the Army knowing I would most likely deploy to Afghanistan. I gave some reason that I honestly can’t remember because I was more in shock that these two men who had escaped death once would voluntarily return to a warzone.
“Because if Americans are willing to risk their life for my country [Afghanistan]”, Seb told me, “the least I can do is come back and translate for you.”
I won’t ever forget his words. To the average Afghan, our efforts meant something. It gave them a hope of a more free and fruitful country. But when leaders behave like Ghani, it doesn’t matter how many Seb or Ramzis there are: they will always be fighting a losing battle.
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I don’t regret spending a year of my life there. I did what was asked of me, just like every other service member from every other NATO nation that participated since 2001. I am offended that anyone has the audacity to say the US or any NATO nation turned their back on Afghanistan. We gave them our men and our women and trillions of dollars. We provided them with infrastructure. We ensured security. We gave them hope. When the time came for Afghan leaders to take charge, they were nowhere to be found. They wanted the glory when it was easy and failed their people when they were needed most.
I am an American soldier and a proud one. Last month I had friends leave their homes on emergency notice to go to Afghanistan and partake in a final rescue mission before the Taliban took complete control. While the United States sent its men and women to save strangers, the leaders of Afghanistan left their own people to suffer and die. They were the captain who didn’t go down with their ship.
